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How to Navigate the Ethical Risks of Doing Business in China – HBR.org Daily

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Xi Jinping’s China is different than the country companies dealt with in the 1990s and 2000s. China’s size, state capacity, and specific policies create unique ethical risks; companies can inadvertently become involved in human rights violations or military projects. Firms have dealt with this situation through four common strategies: withdraw, continue and contain, operate with opposition, and support China’s standards. To find the right strategy, executives should follow these five principles: 1) increase your due diligence on any initiative involving China, 2) proactively consider the alternatives to doing business in China, 3) avoid transferring technology that might have military or surveillance applications, or investing in ways that will make sensitive tech more available, 4) be as transparent as possible about your operations and investments, and your ethical safeguards, 5) give employees with conscientious objections to doing business with China a way to voice these concerns and opt-out of specific projects.
For decades, companies have poured into China to take advantage of the country’s manufacturing prowess and to serve its enormous market. While firms were largely aware of potential business risks, like intellectual property theft and the need to navigate corruption, executives have been less concerned about risks to their firms’ ethics and reputation. But in recent years the situation has changed dramatically, and companies such as Google, Disney, and the NBA have to steer through a much more perilous, and in some cases impassable, ethical landscape.

There are two factors that are driving this changing context. First, instead of becoming more democratic as the country grew richer, the Chinese party-state has grown increasingly repressive. And second, instead of becoming a responsible member of the liberal international order, China is increasingly seen as a threat to it — and to U.S. interests in particular.
As a result, Xi Jinping’s China is different than the country companies dealt with in the 1990s and 2000s. Moreover, China’s size, state capacity, and specific policies create unique ethical risks. The opacity of the party-state and businesses, the growing influence of the party over business, and the difficulty of monitoring supply chains all make it hard for businesses to know where they stand. There’s a high risk of inadvertently being involved in human rights violations or efforts to build up the Chinese military, especially through third parties. Companies can, for example, unintentionally become complicit in the government’s cultural genocide against Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang, where there’s well-documented mass detention, forced labor, separation of children from parents, forced sterilization, and destruction of mosques. As China has rolled back freedoms in Hong Kong and rolled out new repressive policies across the mainland, a growing list of products and services are becoming compromised.
This has created an unprecedented dilemma. China is America’s largest supplier of imports. American businesses have invested over $275 billion in the country since 1990. And investor holdings of Chinese equities and bonds are steadily rising.
For the moment, most companies navigate the challenges of operating in China on an ad-hoc, per issue basis. Google, for example, pulled out of the country in 2010 over censorship concerns. Yet it later founded an AI research center in Beijing and worked on a censored Chinese search engine, code-named “Dragonfly,” which it was forced to suspend after outraged employees protested in 2018. This ad-hoc approach only increases the risks companies face.
Right now, Western companies need a clear set of principles to guide their actions and limit ethical risks. Just like other risk-management schemes, these principles should answer complex questions — recognizing that complex political-economic dynamics, ethical blind spots, investment implications, and personnel considerations at play.
Despite growing commitment to business ethics and corporate social responsibility — including environmental, social, and governance (ESG) standards — there is little public discussion among Western companies about the ethics of operating in China. Broadly speaking, however, there are four different approaches.
First, some firms have decided the risks are too great and have withdrawn from the country. Yahoo, for example, withdrew from China in November 2021 due to an “increasingly challenging business and legal environment,” according to a statement by the company. The move coincided with the government’s introduction of new rules on the management of data. This followed on the heels of a similar move made by Microsoft’s LinkedIn, who left because of “significantly more challenging operating environment and greater compliance requirements in China.” Reformation, a women’s clothing brand, completely stopped using cotton from China (though it still does some manufacturing there) because it couldn’t guarantee that it was not produced with forced labor.
Many others maintain ambitious plans for the country, only trying to limit their exposure to abuses and avoid attention from Western activists, media, and the Chinese government.
Disney remains bullish on China even though its streaming service, Disney+, is banned from the country. Still, the company operates theme parks, distributes films, and develops content. This has risks, as the movie Mulan highlights. Shot in Xinjiang, the credits thanked several government entities, including one operating detention camps and sanctioned by the U.S. Commerce Department. The lead actress supported the crackdown on Hong Kong protesters. In response, activists in Hong Kong and the West called for a boycott of the movie.
Similarly, Wall Street remains publicly bullish. BlackRock, the world’s biggest asset manager — and a large supporter of ESG — urged investors to boost their portfolio allocations of Chinese assets by up to three times. Driven by Beijing’s opening of its financial markets, J.P. Morgan, Goldman Sachs, and others have taken a similar stance. George Soros called BlackRock’s approach a “tragic mistake” that is “likely to lose money” for clients and “damage the national security interests of the U.S. and other democracies.”
A third set of firms have tried to make clear their opposition to rights abuses while continuing to do business on a large scale in the country, and many have faced backlash within China. After H&M voiced concerns about forced labor, Beijing orchestrated a boycott of the company, erasing its presence on e-commerce sites and map apps and fanning outrage through state and social media. Twenty H&M stores were forced to close, and sales dropped 28% in China from the previous year. While H&M maintains its public stance on Xinjiang, firms such as Zara owner Inditex have removed or altered their statements to avoid any conflict with the party-state.
Some companies — typically those most dependent on China — have stood strongly in support of China’s actions. Muji, the Japanese retailer, has advertised products made with “Xinjiang cotton.” Cathay Pacific replaced its CEO (he resigned under pressure) and fired some staff due to their support of the protests in Hong Kong. The owner, Swire Pacific, vowed support for China’s actions in the territory after its access to mainland routes was threatened. Some companies, such as Nike, Coca-Cola, and Apple, have even lobbied against U.S. legislation that would force them to restrict their exposure to Xinjiang.
Given China’s growing repression and threat to the liberal international order, companies should be reevaluating their approach. Additionally, in China, the line between any purely civilian endeavor that benefits the population and contributions to state-led repression are getting blurrier by the day. The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, an independent government agency tasked with evaluating the risks stemming from China, warns, “U.S. businesses and investors must recognize that their participation in the Chinese economy is conditioned by the CCP’s policy priorities and subject to its control.” It is often hard to know when any reasonable line has been crossed.
Here are five principles to help executives find “the reasonable line” and proactively guard against risk:
Firms should perform much more rigorous due diligence on any initiative involving China and Chinese firms. Many may be doing this in response to regulatory pressure, but they likely need to go a step further than what regulations require. Tracking down links to the country’s huge security and surveillance apparatus is much harder than it looks — and is only getting harder. For example, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), a paramilitary organization run by Party and China’s central government that has been sanctioned by the U.S. Department of Treasury for its human rights abuses, has, according to one accounting, “over 862,600 direct and indirect holdings, including minority, majority, control, and non-control positions.” These touch 147 countries and involve as many as 34 layers of ownership.
The environmental movement’s sophisticated auditing methods, which examine every aspect of a company’s environmental impact — checking its supply, manufacturing, and distribution chain for everything from energy usage to waste products to air emissions — provide some cues on how this might be done. In this case, the audits would check for any connection to China’s myriad human rights violations.
While it’s hard to ignore the market, there are fewer and fewer justifications for buying products from or manufacturing in China if there are other options available. This is especially so given the growing regulatory, legal, and reputational risks. In France, for example, the prosecutor’s office has opened an investigation into whether four apparel companies — Inditex, which owns Zara; Uniqlo; Skechers; and SMCP, the owner of Sandro and Maje — have profited from and concealed “crimes against humanity” by using Uyghur forced laborers. The World Tennis Association recently reconsidered its justifications for doing business in China when it threatened to stop — and forego hundreds of millions of dollars — unless the country confirmed the safety of star player Peng Shuai.
If companies take ESG seriously, stepping back from China makes particular sense. The country is now arguably many companies’ largest ESG risk, and ratings agencies consistently overrate Chinese companies. For example, Chinese banks such as China Construction Bank (S&P Global ESG ranking of 45) often have higher ESG ratings than Western banks such as Credit Suisse (S&P Global ESG ranking of 86) despite their deep involvement with China’s human rights and environmental policies.
The ESG risks are particularly underplayed in the financial sector, which is both establishing new ventures and funneling a growing share of investors’ capital into the country, despite the difficulty in avoiding entanglement in the country’s varied rights violations. For instance, Alibaba, which has developed facial recognition software targeting Uyghurs and helped build the prison camps where over a million Uyghurs have been imprisoned, has the second highest weighting in the MSCI Emerging Markets Index. Given that a commitment to both ESG and China is not possible, companies and investors should beware of the hidden risks given that ESG ratings and the financial sector may paint a rosier picture of doing business in China via their ratings vs. reality.
Firms should not only avoid transferring technology that might have military or surveillance applications (a practice already regulated by the U.S. government), but should avoid investing in ways that might make the knowledge of any related technology more available. Given the Party’s increasing oversight of private business, emphasis on civil-military fusion, and plans for overtaking the West in key technologies, the risk of unsuspectedly helping it have grown substantially. Even if an action breaks no law — the scope of what is banned is relatively small but steadily growing — it may be a clear breach of any reasonable ethical standard.
Products developed in collaboration or shared with a Chinese company could be repurposed for military use — without the foreign company’s consent or even knowledge. Technology developed in a research center or used in a factory could easily be transferred to another company when an employee leaves or works clandestinely elsewhere. Bill Bishop, a digital-media entrepreneur, calls out this naiveté: “I know people in Silicon Valley are really smart, and they’re really successful because they can overcome any problem they face. … I don’t think they’ve ever faced a problem like the Chinese Communist Party.”
Companies that deal in highly sensitive technology should strongly consider not selling to or deploying their tech in China. In other sensitive cases, they should strictly limit who has access — e.g., the technology or know-how could be used in a fully-owned factory with tight controls, but not in a joint venture or in a sale. Less sensitive but still at-risk technology might be sold but only to firms that have been carefully vetted. In addition, firms should invest more in cybersecurity and other safeguards to avoid the kind of IP theft that has become all too common in recent years.
Be as transparent as you can be about your operations and investments, and highlight all the measures you are using to ensure ethical practices are being followed. This will not only help identify ethical risks — the process itself will force greater compliance with standards — but also limit the reputational fallout if some unexpected information about a partner or supplier or investment appears.
Consider publishing a comprehensive list of Chinese suppliers, collaborators, and partners, including government entities, state-owned enterprises, public research laboratories, universities, and any other entities that you are working with. While the pressure from the party-state can be great at times, publishing your ethical standards and then regularly reporting on how you are accounting for your actions according to them will limit surprises.
Finally, firms should give employees with conscientious objections to doing business with China a way to voice these concerns and opt-out of specific projects. Such objections are becoming more common, with companies being forced to balance competing needs to maintain an efficient as well as attractive place to work. In most cases, this won’t affect a company’s decisions. However, if it turns out that a significant number of staff feel this way, executives may have no choice but reconsider their plans. In Google’s case, 600 employees signaled their objection to Dragonfly in an open letter demanding that it be ended, writing “We object to technologies that aid the powerful in oppressing the vulnerable.”
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Doing business in China ethically is likely to get harder and harder going forward given Xi Jinping’s expanding mandate and agenda. Executives should utilize the five principles above and remember, as George Magnus, former chief economist at UBS, writes, “As a more restrictive regulatory and governance system is brought to bear on everything from Chinese schools and universities to companies, media and entertainment, and often abruptly and without recourse to appeal, investors in Chinese assets will have to weigh the risks more carefully.”
All of this suggests that the narrative on China ought to change among executives. Too many companies are operating as if it is still 2005 — as if the market was full of rich pickings, the government was increasing people’s freedoms, and doing business in the country did not pose so many moral questions.

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Beijing Surging Equipment to Moscow to Help War…

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Beijing Surging Equipment to Moscow to Help War…

WASHINGTON (AP) — China has surged sales to Russia of machine tools, microelectronics and other technology that Moscow in turn is using to produce missiles, tanks, aircraft and other weaponry for use in its war against Ukraine, according to a U.S. assessment.

Two senior Biden administration officials, who discussed the sensitive findings Friday on the condition of anonymity, said that in 2023 about 90% of Russia’s microelectronics came from China, which Russia has used to make missiles, tanks and aircraft. Nearly 70% of Russia’s approximately $900 million in machine tool imports in the last quarter of 2023 came from China.

Chinese and Russian entities have also been working to jointly produce unmanned aerial vehicles inside Russia, and Chinese companies are likely providing Russia with nitrocellulose used in the manufacture of ammunition, the officials said. China-based companies Wuhan Global Sensor Technology Co., Wuhan Tongsheng Technology Co. Ltd. and Hikvision are providing optical components for use in Russian tanks and armored vehicles.

The officials said Russia has received military optics for use in tanks and armored vehicles manufactured by Chinese firms iRay Technology and North China Research Institute of Electro-Optics, and China has been providing Russia with UAV engines and turbojet engines for cruise missiles.

Russia’s semiconductor imports from China jumped from $200 million in 2021 to over $500 million in 2022, according to Russian customs data analyzed by the Free Russia Foundation, a group that advocates for civil society development.

Beijing is also working with Russia to improve its satellite and other space-based capabilities for use in Ukraine, a development the officials say could in the longer term increase the threat Russia poses across Europe. The officials, citing downgraded intelligence findings, said the U.S. has also determined that China is providing imagery to Russia for its war on Ukraine.

The officials discussed the findings as Secretary of State Antony Blinken is expected to travel to China this month for talks. Blinken is scheduled to travel next week to the Group of 7 foreign ministers meeting in Capri, Italy, where he’s expected to raise concerns about China’s growing indirect support for Russia as Moscow revamps its military and looks to consolidate recent gains in Ukraine.

President Joe Biden has previously raised his concerns directly with Chinese President Xi Jinping about Beijing indirectly supporting Russia’s war effort.

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While China has not provided direct lethal military support for Russia, it has backed it diplomatically in blaming the West for provoking Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to launch the war and refrained from calling it an invasion in deference to the Kremlin.

China has repeatedly said it isn’t providing Russia with arms or military assistance, although it has maintained robust economic connections with Moscow, alongside India and other countries, amid sanctions from Washington and its allies.

“The normal trade between China and Russia should not be interfered or restricted,” said Liu Pengyu, spokesman of the Chinese Embassy in Washington. “We urge the U.S. side to refrain from disparaging and scapegoating the normal relationship between China and Russia.”

Xi met in Beijing on Tuesday with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who heaped praise on Xi’s leadership.

Russia’s growing economic and diplomatic isolation has made it increasingly reliant on China, its former rival for leadership of the Communist bloc during the Cold War.

Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, who returned to Washington this week from a visit to Beijing, said she warned Chinese officials that the Biden administration was prepared to sanction Chinese banks, companies and Beijing’s leadership, if they assist Russia’s armed forces with its ongoing invasion of Ukraine.

The Democratic president issued an executive order in December giving Yellen the authority to sanction financial institutions that aided Russia’s military-industrial complex.

“We continue to be concerned about the role that any firms, including those in the PRC, are playing in Russia’s military procurement,” Yellen told reporters, using the initials for the People’s Republic of China. “I stressed that companies, including those in the PRC, must not provide material support for Russia’s war and that they will face significant consequences if they do. And I reinforced that any banks that facilitate significant transactions that channel military or dual-use goods to Russia’s defense industrial base expose themselves to the risk of U.S. sanctions.”

The U.S. has frequently downgraded and unveiled intelligence findings about Russia’s plans and operations over the course of the more than 2-year-old war with Ukraine.

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Such efforts have been focused on highlighting plans for Russian misinformation operations or to throw attention on Moscow’s difficulties in prosecuting its war against Ukraine as well as its coordination with Iran and North Korea to supply it with badly needed weaponry. Blinken last year spotlighted intelligence that showed China was considering providing arms and ammunition to Russia.

The White House believes that the public airing of the intelligence findings has led China, at least for now, to hold off on directly arming Russia. China’s economy has also been slow to emerge from the COVID-19 pandemic. Chinese officials could be sensitive to reaction from European capitals, which have maintained closer ties to Beijing even as the U.S.-China relationship has become more complicated.

Meanwhile, China on Thursday announced rare sanctions against two U.S. defense companies over what it called their support for arms sales to Taiwan, the self-governing island democracy Beijing claims as its own territory to be recovered by force if necessary.

The announcement freezes the assets of General Atomics Aeronautical Systems and General Dynamics Land Systems held within China. It also bars the companies’ management from entering the country.

Filings show General Dynamics operates a half-dozen Gulfstream and jet aviation services operations in China, which remains heavily reliant on foreign aerospace technology even as it attempts to build its own presence in the field.

The company also helps make the Abrams tank being purchased by Taiwan to replace outdated armor intended to deter or resist an invasion from China.

General Atomics produces the Predator and Reaper drones used by the U.S. military.

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AP writers Didi Tang and Fatima Hussein contributed reporting.

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China’s gambling hub of Macao holds its its final horse race, ending a tradition of over 40 years

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China’s gambling hub of Macao holds its its final horse race, ending a tradition of over 40 years

MACAO (AP) — After more than 40 years, Macao’s horse racing track hosted its final races on Saturday, bringing an end to the sport in the city famous for its massive casinos.

In January, the city’s government said it would terminate its contract with the Macao Jockey Club in April. The decision came at the request of the Macao Horse Race Company, which cited operational challenges as part of the reasons for the closure.

On Saturday, gamblers congregated in the half-full stands and placed their final bets. Some tourists also visited the track.

Mai Wan-zun, a student from mainland China in Macao, said she wanted to get a taste of the atmosphere. “We could come to see horse racing here in Macao, but not in mainland China,” she said.

Helena Chong, a Macao resident, decided to visit the race course for the first and last time to see what it’s all about.

“It’s a pity to see the end of all this gambling and entertainment,” she said.

Horse racing in the former Portuguese colony has struggled with economic challenges in recent years and has yet to rebound from the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. Its jockey club had accumulated operating losses of over $311 million, the Macau News Agency earlier reported.

Under the termination arrangement, the horse racing firm had pledged to arrange for transportation of owners’ horses to other locations by March 2025, and handle the company’s employees according to the law, the government said.

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In neighboring Hong Kong, horse-racing remains popular and profitable. Its jockey club runs various gambling activities and is the city’s major donor of many charity works.

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Migrant workers who helped build modern China have scant or no pensions, and can’t retire

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Migrant workers who helped build modern China have scant or no pensions, and can’t retire

BEIJING (AP) — At 53, Guan Junling is too old to get hired at factories anymore. But for migrant workers like her, not working is not an option.

For decades, they have come from farming villages to find work in the cities. Toiling in sweatshops and building apartment complexes they could never afford to live in, they played a vital role in China’s transformation into an economic powerhouse.

As they grow older, the first generation of migrant workers is struggling to find jobs in a slowing economy. Many are financially strapped, so they have to keep looking.

“There is no such thing as a ‘retirement’ or ‘pensions’ for rural people. You can only rely on yourself and work,” Guan said. “When can you stop working? It’s really not until you have to lie in bed and you can’t do anything.”

She now relies on housecleaning gigs, working long days to squirrel away a little money in case of a health emergency. Migrant workers can get subsidized health care in their hometowns, but they have little or no coverage elsewhere. If Guan needs to go to hospital in Beijing, she has to pay out of pocket.

As China’s population ages, so are its migrant workers. About 85 million were over 50 in 2022, the latest year for which data is available, accounting for 29% of all migrant workers and up from 15% a decade earlier. With limited or no pensions and health insurance, they need to keep working.

About 75% said they would work beyond the age of 60 in a questionnaire distributed to 2,500 first-generation migrant workers between 2018 to 2022, according to Qiu Fengxian, a scholar on rural sociology who described her research in a talk last year. The first-generation refers to those born in the 1970s or earlier.

Older workers are being hit by a double whammy. Jobs have dried up in construction due to a downturn in the real estate market and in factories because of automation and the slowing economy. Age discrimination is common, so jobs tend to go to younger people.

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“For young people, of course, you can still find a job, positions are available, though the wage is not high enough,” said Zhang Chenggang of Beijing’s Capital University of Economics and Business, where he directs a center researching new forms of employment.

“But for older migrant workers, there simply are no positions,” said Zhang, who conducted field studies at four labor markets across China late last year. “Now, the problem is that no matter how low the wage is, as long as someone pays, you will take the job.”

Some job recruiters contacted by AP said older workers don’t work well or have underlying illnesses. Others declined to answer and hung up.

Many are turning to temporary work. Zhang Zixing was looking for gigs on a cold winter day late last year at a sprawling outdoor labor market on the outskirts of Beijing.

He said he was fired from a job delivering packages because of his age about three years ago, when he reached 55. In December, he was earning 260 yuan (about $35) a day installing cables at construction sites.

Zhang Quanshou, a village official in Henan province and a delegate to China’s National People’s Congress, said some older migrant workers are just looking for work near their hometowns, while others still head to larger cities.

“Some older migrant workers are finding temporary jobs, so it is important to build the temporary job market and provide a better platform for such services,” Zhang, the Communist Party secretary of the village, said in an emailed response to questions during a recent annual meeting of the Congress.

Guan, who comes from a rice-farming region in the north, worked on a clothing factory assembly line until she was laid off when she was in her 40s. She then worked various jobs in different cities, winding up in Beijing in 2018.

She works seven days a week, partly because she’s afraid labor agencies won’t call again if she turns an offer down.

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Over February’s Lunar New Year holiday, when migrant workers traditionally go home to visit their families, she stayed in Beijing as a caretaker for an elderly woman, because the woman needed help and she needed the money.

“People either want someone who’s educated or young, and I don’t meet either of those requirements,” said Guan, who dropped out after middle school because her parents had only enough money to educate their son. “But then I think, regardless of how other people look at me, I have to survive.”

Guan worries jobs will be even harder to find when she reaches 55. The retirement age for women in China is 50 or 55, depending on the company and type of work. For men, it is 60.

Lu Guoquan, a trade union official, has proposed relaxing age limits for jobs, judging workers by their physical condition instead of their age and making it easier for older people to find work through labor markets and online platforms.

“A large number of farmers have entered cities, making an important contribution to the modernization of our country,” said his proposal, made to an advisory body during the recent national congress and seen by the AP.

As workers grow older, “they are gradually becoming a relatively vulnerable group in the labor market and face a number of thresholds and problems in continuing to work,” it said.

Lu, director of the general office of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, declined an interview request.

Duan Shuangzhu has spent 25 years collecting trash in one Beijing neighborhood after giving up a life of raising sheep and cows in north China’s Shanxi province when he was in his 40s. He gets up at 3:30 a.m. seven days a week to make his rounds. For that, he earns 3,300 yuan ($460) a month and has a basement room to live in.

Duan’s wife stayed on the farm, where she looks after their grandchildren. Duan has managed to save money for himself, his children and his grandchildren, but never paid into a pension system, directing what little he earns to his family.

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That fits the pattern Qiu found in her research, which she published in a book last year. Older migrant workers moved to the cities to improve the lives of their children and other relatives, not themselves, she found. Most have limited or no savings, and few have climbed the economic ladder. They hoped their children would, but most ended up as migrant workers, too.

Most migrant workers’ earnings were spent on their children’s marriages, homes and education, Qiu said in her talk. “Basically, they did not begin working for themselves and planning for their own late years until the age of 55.”

Duan, at 68, has no plans to quit.

“As long as I can work every day, it’s enough to survive,” he said, standing next to a set of community rubbish bins, color-coded for recycling. “I didn’t grow up in a wealthy family — just filling my stomach each day is enough for me.”

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Associated Press researcher Wanqing Chen contributed to this story.

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